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Introduction
The property status of a fishing licence has for a long time been undecided.
The judicial decisions have varied significantly on whether a fishing licence
is property at common law or pursuant to various statutory definitions.
The significance of the issue lies primarily in the financial arena. It is most
often the case that the preponderance of the value in a fishing enterprise
lies with the fishing licence rather than in the vessel. It is not uncommon
for a lobster licence to approach one million dollars in value.' When quota
is allocated to groundfish licences, the value of the package can easily
grow to many millions. On the other hand, the fishing vessel may be
worth a fraction of the licence.
For the purposes of financing a fishing enterprise the lender typically
wishes to secure its financing by taking security over available assets, the
foremost of which are the vessel and the licence. Security over a vessel is
easily achieved, typically through a statutory marine mortgage pursuant to
the Canada Shipping Act.' Where the financing is provided to purchase a
vessel and acquire a licence, however, the question is how to secure that
portion of the funding provided for the licence, which is often the majority
of the funding. The uncertain property status of a fishing licence has made
it unclear whether a security interest can be taken in a fishing licence. It
has also been unclear whether a trustee in bankruptcy will have the ability
to deal with fishing licences.

David Henley is with the Halifax office of the firm of Stewart McKelvey. His practice focuses
in the area of maritime law. He is a member of the part-time faculty at the Dalhousie Law School
teaching Fisheries Law.
1. Such is the case with a District 35 lobster fishing licence, though there is a wide variance in value
between districts. Groundfish licences can reach multi-million dollar values depending upon the quota
assigned to them.
2.
CanadaShipping Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.S-9.
*
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Lenders have found ways around this through the use of guarantees
and pledges over other non-marine security such as the borrower's real
property. This approach, however, restricts dealing in the borrower's
available collateral, presuming it even exists, and generally adds costs to
the financing. A recent case heard in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia
and appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, Royal Bank of Canada
v. Saulnier,3 bears directly on the issue and adds significant clarity. This
paper will canvass the law regarding the property status of a fishing
licence leading up to the Saulnier decision. After a review of the general
nature of a fishing licence, both as defined by legislation and common
law, the primary issues addressed in Saulnierwill be examined. These are
(1) whether a fishing licence is personal property under personal property
security legislation such that a security interest can be taken in it and (2)
whether a fishing licence is property under the Bankruptcy andInsolvency
Act, 4 such that a trustee in bankruptcy gains control of it once the licence
holder becomes a bankrupt.
I. The nature of a fishing licence
The most appropriate place to begin to understand the status of a fishing
licence is the Fisheries (General)Regulations.5 The following provisions
are relevant:
"document" means a licence, fisher's registration card or vessel
registration card that grants a legal privilege to engage in fishing or any
other activity related to fishing and fisheries;
10. Unless otherwise specified in a document, a document expires
(a) where it is issued for a calendar year, on December 31 of the year
for which it is issued; or
(b) where it is issued for a fiscal year, on March 31 of the year for
which it is issued.
16. (1) A document is the property of the Crown and is not transferable.
(2) The issuance of a document of any type to any person does not imply
or confer any future right or privilege for that
person to be issued a
6
document of the same type or any other type.

3.
4.
5.
6.

2006 NSCA 91, rev'g in part 2006 NSSC 34 [Saulnier].
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3.
S.O.R./93-53.
Ibid.at ss. 10, 16.
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There is no question as to the intent of the legislation. The definition of
"document," which includes licences, specifically contemplates that it is
a privilege, though section 16(1) suggests that there is a property interest.
To the extent that property exists in a fishing licence, however, it is and will
remain the property of the Crown. The statement that a document is not
transferable has been the focus of many of the decisions, as will become
evident below. It is noteworthy that the provisions do not contemplate any
distinction between legal and beneficial interests.
The Federal Court of Appeal addressed the status of a licence in the
split decision of Joys v. Minister of National Revenue7 which was an
appeal from the trial decision that a commercial fishing licence was an
integral part of the plaintiff's boat. The vessel was seized by Customs
authorities under their ability to seize "conveyances" after it was used to
import marijuana into Canada. The licence was issued to the vessel and
the Minister directed that it be included in the seizure. The Trial Judge
held that the licence became an "integral part" of the vessel and was
properly included in the seizure and forfeiture. On appeal, Justice Ddcary
held that the licence did not form an integral part of a "conveyance" under
the Customs Act. His comments on licences accord with the general
common law view that a licence is not in itself property. He also gives
little credence to the fact that the licence is issued to the vessel not to a
person, a point which is significant in some of the bankruptcy decisions.
Ultimately, Justice Ddcary concluded that "...it is clear law that a fishing
licence is a privilege granted by the Minister and in the renewal of which
the licence holder has no vested right." 8 Justice Robertson concurred in
the result adding:
As I view it, the answer to the above question hinges on the legal nature
of a commercial fishing licence as issued under the Fisheries Act, R.S.C.,
1985, c. F-14 and the Pacific Fishery Regulations, 1984, SOR/84-337
as amended. As a general observation, it is fair to say that the law
surrounding the legal nature of a commercial fishing licence is not fully
developed, nor was it fully argued before us on appeal. Nonetheless,
there are a few propositions which seem to be well accepted. The reasons
of the Trial Judge below offer a convenient summary (at page 252):
Both parties are essentially in agreement regarding the nature
of a licence, namely that it is a privilege to do something that
would otherwise be illegal, but for the licence. It is also clear
that the grant of a fishing licence orprivilege vests no interest
or property in the grantee. The jurisprudence is also clear that

a fishing licence is an annual licence which does not carry with
7.
8.

(1995), 128 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (F.C.A.) [Joys].
Ibid. at para. 32.
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it a vested right to renewal, Joliffe v. Canada, [1986] 1 F.C. 511
(TD), and Everett v. Canada (Minister of Fisheries and Oceans)
(1994), 169 N.R. 100 (F.C.A.), per Desjardins, J.A. [emphasis
added] 9

As noted by Justice Robertson in Joys, the law on the status of a licence
is not fully developed. Her unequivocal statement that a fishing licence
grants no interest cannot be entirely accurate. Clearly, the holder has some
interest. The failure of Parliament to clarify the nature of the interest has
led to a great deal of confusion in commercial financing. Arguably, the
FisheriesAct contemplates that a licence is property in the provision that
it is "the property of the Crown." Parliamentary intention, as divined
from the wording of the legislation, can be significant. See for example
Nova Scotia Business Capital Corp. v. Coxheath Gold Holdings Ltd.10 in
which the Court of Appeal found that mineral licences were not property
concluding that there was nothing in the legislation which indicated an
intention to confer proprietary right in the lands or minerals covered by
the licence.
Notwithstanding the legislative provisions, the Department of
Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) has adopted policies which are more
pragmatic. While policies do not actually have the force of law and do
not fetter the Minister's discretion in granting licences, they are intended
to provide guidance to the industry on how in the normal course of events
the DFO will exercise its discretion on the Minister's behalf." Section 5
of the Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for Eastern Canada (1996)
provides the following description of the character of a licence:
5 (a) General
A "licence" grants permission to do something which, without such
permission, would be prohibited. As such, a licence confers no property
or other rights which can be legally sold, bartered or bequeathed.
Essentially, it is a privilege to do something, subject to the terms and
conditions of the licence.
(b) Fishing Licence

9.
Ibid. at para. 48. The reliance on Joliffe v. Canada, [1986] 1 F.C. 511 (T.D.) is expected. In
Joliffe, the Court did not expressly deal with the property issue but it is worth noting the comments of
Justice Strayer that the interest vested in a licence-holder is subject to modification by validly enacted
laws, a point that is particularly relevant when considering whether a fishing licence is property in
the context of statutory law, such as personal property security legislation or the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act.
10. (1994), 135 N.S.R. (2d) 259 (C.A.).
11. See Maple Lodge Farms Ltd v. Canada, [198212 S.C.R. 2 per Mclntyre J. at para. 6; Carpenter
Fishing Corp. v. Canada(1997), 221 N.R. 372 (F.C.A.) per Decary, J.A., at paras. 28-29; and Tucker
v. Canada(2000), 197 F.T.R. 66 per Rothstein, J.A., at para. 19, aff'd (2001), 288 N.R. 10 (F.C.A.).

The Property Status of Fishing Licences
A "fishing licence" is an instrument by which the Minister of Fisheries
and Oceans, pursuant to his discretionary authority under the Fisheries
Act, grants permission to a person including an Aboriginal organization
to harvest certain species offish or marine plants subject to the conditions
attached to the licence. This is in no sense a permanent permission; it
terminates upon expiry of the licence. The licencee is essentially given
a limited fishing privilege rather than any kind of absolute or permanent
"right or property".
(c) Future Commitment
As provided under the Fishery (General) Regulations, the issuance of a
document of any type to any person does not imply or confer any future
right or privilege for that person to be issued a document
of the same
12
type or any other type upon expiry of the document.
As noted above, section 16 of the Fishery (General)Regulations expressly
provides that a "document," which is defined to include a licence, is the
property of the Crown, that the document is not transferable, and that

its issuance to any person does not imply or confer any future right or
privilege for that person to be issued a document of the same type or any
other type. According to the regulations and policies, a fishing licence
consists legally of nothing more than permission to fish, in accordance
with certain terms and conditions, during the period of the licence validity.
In the inshore fishery particularly, licences are typically issued for only
one year at a time. As provided in section 11(2) of the Policy:
11. General Policy Guidelines
(2) Except where a fishery is closed for conservation purposes, licence
renewal and payment of fees is mandatory on a yearly basis in order to

retain the privilege to be issued the licence) 3

How then can a security interest be taken in something which is
definitively stated as being only a "permission" or "privilege"? How can
4
a licence acquire value and be sold if it conveys no property interest?
Notwithstanding the fact that the licences are technically not transferable
and a licence holder has no right to licence renewal, DFO practice has
been to reissue to a given licence holder each year the licence he held in

12. Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for Eastern Canada (1996), Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, Canada, as found on DFO website at http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/licpol/chl_e.htm
[the "Policy"].
13. Ibid. ats. 11(2).
14. The question of how this affects the estates of fishers is best left to another paper though these
issues bear directly upon the issue. The licence is often the main source of retirement income for a
fisher. A fisher builds equity in the fishing enterprise over time and needs a degree of certainty that in
later years it will be capable of transfer or sale to finance retirement.
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the previous year, or to issue a "replacement" licence to another eligible
person upon the previous licence holder's request. This practice is
described in the first two subsections of section 16 of the Policy:
16. Change of Licence Holder
(1) Current legislation provides that licences are not transferable.
However, the Minister in "his absolute discretion" may for administrative
efficiency prescribe in policy those conditions or requirements under
which he will issue a licence to a new licence holder as a "replacement"
for an existing licence being relinquished. These prescribed conditions
or requirements are specified in this document.
(2) Subject to subsection (5), a replacement licence may be issued upon
request by the current licence holder to an eligible fisher recommended
by the current licence holder. 5
Accordingly, while DFO is not obliged to do so, in practice it will comply
with a licence holder's request to have a licence issued to another person as
a replacement for his own. This is the manner in which what is commonly
referred to as licence "transfer" is effected. Technically, it does not
represent a transfer of a licence but rather a cancellation of the licence and
the issuance of a replacement licence to another person.
A common means to obtain "security" (although not a security interest
in the conventional sense) over a licence is by obtaining a covenant from
the licence holder to apply to DFO for issuance of a replacement licence to
the lender's nominee, in the case of an event of default under the financing
agreements. Whether a transfer will be effected as requested is always
subject to the absolute discretion of the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans.
DFO has in practice respected such requests, but it is not obliged to do so.
Under the present Act and Regulations DFO may at any time opt to change
its policies in respect of such licence transfers.
The issue of whether courts will enforce the contractual obligation to
effect the transfer of a licence has arisen in the context of trust agreements.
The leading case in Nova Scotia on the legality and enforceability of
such arrangements is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Theriault v.
Corkum.16 In Theriault,a company owned by Theriault sold its vessel to a
company owned by Corkum, on condition of the issuance to Corkum of a
fishing licence as a replacement for that which had been held by Theriault.
Because of a DFO policy that a licence will be reissued only once in a
twelve month period, and because the licence had recently been reissued,
the parties entered into an agreement whereby Theriault would continue
15.
16.

Supra note 12 at s. 16.
(1993), 121 N.S.R. (2d) 99 (C.A.) [Theriault].
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to hold the licence for the benefit of Corkum until it was possible for
Theriault to request transfer of the licence to Corkum or his nominee. One
of the principal issues in the case was whether this trust arrangement was
illegal as contrary to the FisheriesAct and its regulations. The decision
of first instance was by an arbitrator who held that the trust arrangement
between the parties was legal and enforceable. This decision was upheld
by both the trial and appeal courts on the basis that the agreement did not
contravene any express prohibitions within the Act.
The Court in Theriaultrelied upon the leading case of British Columbia
PackersLtd. v. Sparrow." That case involved a trust agreement regarding
a herring sein licence, which was a category of licence upon which DFO
had imposed transfer restrictions. Because of these restrictions, on the
sale of Sparrow's fishing vessel to B.C. Packers, the parties entered into
an agreement whereby the licence would remain in Sparrow's name and
the beneficial interest in the licence would be transferred to B.C. Packers
until such time as it was possible for Sparrow to request reissuance.
The British Columbia Court of Appeal rejected Sparrow's argument
that the agreement was illegal and unenforceable, holding that it did not
contravene any express provisions of the Fisheries Act. The decision of
Justice MacDonald is noteworthy because he found that the statute did
not prohibit the transfer of the beneficial interest, as opposed to the legal
interest, in the licence:
I reach now my opinion upon the issue. I think the judge found for the
respondent for valid reasons. He concluded [p. 307] "that the contract
was not illegal due to breach of express statutory provisions." That met
para. 7 of the appellant's statement of defence which says:
In answer to the whole of the statement of claim, the Defendant
says that the Agreement, in so far as it relates to the "H" Licence,
is unenforceable as being illegal and contrary to the Fisheries
Act Regulations referred to above and public policy.
There is the same result if one ascertains the object of the agreement and
inquires whether what was to be done thereunder was an illegal act. The
object of the agreement was the transfer of all beneficial interest in the
herring licence to the respondent, Sparrow, who was to remain a bare
trustee holding the legal title. It would be unprofitable elaboration to do
more than say that one can search the statute and regulations and find
no prohibition of transfer of beneficial interest in a herring licence. The

17.

(1989), 35 B.C.L.R. (2d) 334 (B.C.C.A.) [Sparrow].
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restrictions apply only to dealing with the legal title. 8

The distinction between a legal and beneficial interest is one which is
significant. The courts have recognized that there is more than simply a
title interest in a licence. A beneficial interest is essentially some further
benefit or right beyond legal title. 9 In the trial decision of Saulnier, as

discussed below, Chief Justice Kennedy acknowledged that there is a
"bundle of rights" in a licence and implicitly not all of those rights are
restricted by the statutory provisions.2 ° Can those rights which are relevant
to particular issues then be considered property in the hands of the licenceholder for certain statutes?
II. PersonalProperty Security Act (PPSA)2'

There is no doubt that if a fishing licence is property, it must be personal
property. A fishing licence has no connection to real property. The treatment
of licences under the provincial personal property security legislation is
significant because the definitions within this legislation rely largely upon
the common law interpretation of personal property. In order for the PPSA
to apply, a licence would need to be personal property within the meaning
of the Act:
"personal property" means goods, a document of title, chattel paper, a
security, an instrument, money or an intangible;

This definition of personal property does not clearly encompass a licence.
It is possible that a licence is an intangible, which is defined as:
18. Ibid. at paras. 14-15. For similar comments on the enforceability of such agreements see also
Smith v. Humehitt Estate (1990), 48 B.C.L.R. (2d) 361 (B.C.S.C.), Cabot v. Hicks (1999), 176 NfId.
& P.E.I.R. 48 (N.L.S.C.), R. Baker Fisheries Ltd. v. Widrig, [1998] N.S.J. No. 158 (N.S. S.C.) and
Goulden v Smith, 2003 NSSC 215. In the latter two cases the Court actually ordered that the defendant
take the necessary steps to transfer the licence in question. There are, however, occasional contrary
decisions. In a recent case from the Newfoundland and Labrador Supreme Court, Loder v. Citifinancial
CanadaInc., 2006 NLTD 8, Justice Orsborn declined to give effect to a trust agreement transferring
the beneficial interest in a fishing licence, though the decision appears to be founded upon Loder's lack
of qualification to hold the licence. The Court makes a particular distinction between circumventing
the regulations for the purposes of avoiding qualification and the usual process of circumventing
section 16(1) of the Fishery (General)Regulations which holds that "a document is the property of
the Crown and is not transferrable." This case is clearly fact specific but does raise the spectre that a
Court may choose not to enforce a trust agreement in certain circumstances.
19. The fisheries cases typically make the distinction from legal title without defining the relationship.
See for example Re Bennett, infra note 50 or Sparrow, supranote 17. A useful definition of "beneficial
owner" can be found in Black's. "One who does not have title to property but has rights in the property
which are normal incident of owning the property"; Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., s. v. "beneficial
owner."
20. Saulnier,supra note 3 at para. 54.
21. For the purposes of this paper the references shall be to the PersonalPropertySecurityAct, S.N.S.
1995-96, c.13, though the relevant aspects of personal property security legislation are consistent
across Canada.
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"intangible" means personal property that is not goods, a document of
title, chattel paper, a security, an instrument or money.
As is evident, the definitions are somewhat circular. The Ontario courts
have directly addressed the issue of whether a licence is personal property
for the purposes of the PPSA in the context of a nursing home licence
in Sugarman v. Duca Community Credit Union Ltd.22 In Sugarman, the
applicant credit union had a security agreement in which it was given a
security interest in the respondent's nursing home licence. An application
was brought to determine whether one could gain a security interest in the
licence. It should first be noted that the decision of the Court was heavily
influenced by the fact that the Nursing Homes Act specifically recognized
that one may acquire a security interest in a nursing home licence. Justice
Lederman stated:
Ontario Courts have generally regarded licenses issued under a regulatory
regime as being either a privilege or a right depending on the extent of
discretionary control over transferability maintained by the overseeing
regulatory authority. If the discretion was considered broad, then the
licence would be characterized as a privilege, whereas if the discretion
was of a limited nature, then
the license would be viewed as a property
23
right in the licence holder.
He then went on to review previous cases where a licence had been
24
considered not to be property.
It is important to note the relevant components of the regulatory system
in Sugarman. The scheme provided for the licencee to transfer his or her
interest in a licence to another by conditional surrender and replacement
under section 7 of the Act. The licencing body's ability to refuse to renew
or to revoke the licence was not unfettered and was confined to certain
specific grounds. There was an appeal procedure which entitled a licencee
to a hearing if the licence was not going to be renewed. Despite significant
differences from the fisheries regime, the Court's comments on commercial
issues and transferability are useful. Justice Lederman acknowledged the
commercial realities, which are of singular importance in the context of
fishing licences:
While the jurisprudence has, for the most part, emphasized the concept
22. (1998), 38 O.R. (3d)429 [Sugarman].
23. Ibid. at para. 32.
24. National Trust Co. v. Bouckhuyt (1987), 7 P.P.S.A.C. 273 (Ont. C.A.) [Bouckhuyt] dealing with a
tobacco quota; and 209991 OntarioLtd. v. CanadianImperial Bank ofCommerce (1988), 8 P.P.S.A.C.
135 (Ont. H.C.) [209991 Ontario Ltd.] for a nursing home licence. The security interests in these cases
both arose (or sought to arise) by way of a chattel mortgage whereas the security interest in Sugarman
arose from a general security agreement which specifies the nursing home licence as collateral.
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and degree of transferability, when assessing the nature and extent of a
security interest, this focus, while perhaps relevant to a consideration of
a chattel mortgage, is inappropriate in respect of other security interests.
Transferability per se is not required for the creation of security interests in
intangibles under a general security agreement. With a chattel mortgage,
there is an express transfer, or legal assignment by the mortgagor. In
contrast, a security interest in an intangible does not involve an express
transfer but rather is an acknowledgment that the holder has a bundle of
rights which may be exercised in respect of some specified collateral. To
the extent that there may be limitations on the security holder's exercise
of those rights because of regulatory controls, that is a risk that the
security holder is prepared to and must take. 5
He went on to conclude:
In the instant case, the Nursing Homes Act specifically recognizes that
one may acquire a security interest in a nursing home licence. It would
be fundamentally wrong to deprive such a secured party of priority
rights under the PPSA on the basis that a nursing home licence does
not constitute "personal property" under traditional notions of property,
rather than recognizing the commercial reality that a nursing home
licence does qualify as "collateral".
Clearly, the legislature contemplated that the interest of a nursing home
licence could be subject to a security interest. That alone should suffice to
conclude that the licence constitutes "collateral" and "personal property"
within the meaning of the PPSA.
For these reasons, I find that the nursing home licence in question
constitutes personal property and is capable of supporting a security
interest under the PPSA.26
The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.27 In his brief decision Justice
Finlayson states:
I find it difficult to accept that the Legislature would expressly recognize
a security interest in a nursing home licence without being aware that
the case law has taken a restrictive view of what constitutes personal
property in the context of various financing arrangements. The definition
of "security interest" in the Nursing Home Act has no significance except
in connection with the P.P.S.A. In my opinion, the references to "security
interest" in the Nursing Homes Act are a recognition of the realities of
the market and are intended to clarify that the interest of a licensee in
a nursing home licence can constitute collateral under the P.P.S.A. and
that the enforcement of such security interest is subject to the approval
of the Director.

25.

Sugarman, supranote 22 at para. 56.

26. Ibid. at paras. 58-60.
27.

(1999), 14 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 264

The Property Status of Fishing Licences
Additionally and alternatively, I accept the analysis of the case law set
out in the reasons of Lederman J. in which he concludes that a nursing
home licence is in the nature of a property right and can be the subject
of a security interest under the P.P.S.A. His reasons accept that such a
licence is embraced by a regulatory framework that, while restricting its
transfer, protects it from arbitrary revocation and/or non-renewal such
that the licence is neither transitory nor ephemeral.2"
Clearly the presence of the definition of security interest in the
Nursing Homes Act played a significant part in the Court's conclusions in
Sugarman, a fact which must be borne in mind when considering fishing
licences. The decisions in Bouckhuyt and 209991 Ontario Ltd. dealing
29
with matters other than the PPSA were considered by Justice Lederman.
The decision in Bouckhuyt, dealing with tobacco quota, focused on the
degree of discretion exercised by the regulatory authority, noting that:
The regulations do indeed control each and every aspect of the
production, sale and marketing of tobacco in Ontario. For example, the
regulations provide for the licensing of all persons who are engaged in
the producing or marketing of tobacco. As well, no one can produce or
market tobacco without such a licence. The regulations provide for the
fixing and allotting by the Tobacco Board of quotas for the marketing
of tobacco. The Tobacco Board can refuse to fix or allot to any person
such a quota and may cancel or reduce or refuse to increase a quota. No
one can market tobacco in excess of the quota which has been allotted.
The board regulations go so far as to provide for the seizure, removal
or destruction of tobacco which has been produced in violation of the
regulations to the BPQ. In sum, the control exercised by the Tobacco
Board is absolute and complete.
It is true that the BPQ may be leased and, in a rather peculiar form, it
may be transferred and pledged. This is accomplished by the board first
cancelling the BPQ and then reissuing it to the purchaser. This same
formula is utilized for the leasing from year to year of a quota. However,
what is of paramount significance is that all transactions pertaining to the
BPQ are made subject to the approval of the board and are subject to the
unfettered discretion of the board."
Justice Cory then went on to conclude that the quota did not constitute
property:
... The BPQ is thus no more than the manifestation of permission to do
that which is otherwise prohibited by statute and regulation; the BPQ
represents the granting of a privilege. It is by its nature subject to such
discretionary control and is so transitory and ephemeral in its nature that
28.
29.
30.

Ibid. at paras. 21-22.
Bouckhuyt, supra note 24.
Ibid. at paras. 21-22.
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it cannot, in my view, be considered to be property.3
209991 Ontario Ltd. was decided prior to amendments applicable in
Sugarman and significant emphasis was placed on provisions which stated
that a nursing home licence is not transferable. This provision is directly
relevant to interpretation of the effects of the FisheriesAct which also
provides that fishing licences are not transferable.32 Justice Anderson held
that because the licence was not transferable it was not property which
could be mortgaged:
In my view, the plaintiff's claim under the chattel mortgage must fail for
one simple, fundamental reason. The nursing home licence, whatever
the nature of the interest, rights or privileges which it comprises or
represents, is not property which can be mortgaged.

I...
entertain some doubt that the licence in question can appropriately be
called property of any kind. No authority directly on point was provided.
In any event, I have decided that it is not necessary for my purposes
to decide that question. Whatever the legal nature and incidents of the
creature may be, one thing is clear from the statute which calls it into
existence: it is not transferable. That, in my view, is fatal to the claim
under the chattel mortgage.33

Until Saulnier,the view of the court in Sugarman had to be balanced against
the opposing views in Bouckhuyt and 209991 Ontario Ltd. Bouckhuyt
and 209991 OntarioLtd. placed great emphasis on the degree of control
and discretion of the regulatory body. It is noteworthy that section 7 of
the FisheriesAct accords the Minister "absolute discretion" regarding the
issuance of licences for fisheries or fishing. Further, as indicated above,
the Fisheries (General) Regulations specifically provide that licences are
the property of the Crown and are not transferable. On the other hand,
though there is some scope to argue that the discretion is not in practice
exercised in an absolute manner. The practice of DFO, pursuant to its
policies, to effect requested transfers, lends weight to the commercial
reality arguments in Sugarman.
The Court in Sugarman also relied upon a decision of the Ontario
Bankruptcy Court dealing with a taxi licence and whether it constituted
personal property which could be the subject of a security interest under
the PPSA .14 In Re Foster,Justice Lane canvassed the above cases focusing
31. Ibid. at para. 23.
32. Fisheries (General)Regulations, supranote 4 at s. 16(1).
33. 209991 OntarioLtd., supranote 24 at paras. 11-12.
34. Re Foster(1992), 3 P.P.S.A.C. (2d) 6 (Ont. Bktcy.).

The Property Status of Fishing Licences

513

on the degree of discretion. He concluded that the characteristics of the
taxi licence in its regulatory setting were those of property and that the
circumstances were vastly different than those in Bouckhuyt and 209991
OntarioLtd. He described the differences in his comments:
A number of aspects of this by-law are of importance. First, it specifically
contemplates transfer including leases and sub-leases, and after the first
three years imposes no restrictions on transfer other than the personal
suitability of the proposed transferee and the satisfactory inspection of
vehicles [ss. 17, 61, 67]. Second, it creates a prima facie entitlement to
renewal (s.18). Third, Council's discretion in revoking or suspending a
licence is not unfettered, but is, by s. 22, confined to the grounds specified
in s. 18. Fourth, there is an appeal procedure entitling the licensee to a
hearing by the Appeal Committee of Council under the rules laid down
in the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 484, ss. 5-15,
21-24 if it is proposed not to renew the licence [s.28]. Fifth, the licence
is expressly recognized as an asset of the estate of a deceased owner
[s.68]. These are not the characteristics of a "transitory and ephemeral
privilege."35
Until recently, the status of a fishing licence under personal property
legislation fell to be determined by analogy to these cases as there were
no decisions which dealt with fishing licences in the context of personal
property legislation. Thus, there was a great deal of uncertainty on how
a fishing licence would be viewed. It was likely that the tests articulated
above by the Ontario courts would carry significant weight in any future
determination. Recall that Justice Lederman's analysis turned on the
extent of discretionary control over transferability maintained by the
regulatory authority. His view was that Ontario Courts have held that "if the
discretion was considered broad, then the licence would be characterized
as a privilege, whereas if the discretion was of a limited nature, then the
licence would be viewed as a property right in the licence holder. '3 6 Given
the emphasis on discretion and non-transferability in the provisions of the
Fisheries Act and its regulations, there was a reasonable prospect, if the
Ontario jurisprudence were to be applied, that a fishing licence would be
considered not to be personal property for the purposes of the PPSA or
more generally for the purposes of taking a security interest. That said,
it is always difficult to predict how a Court will consider the commercial
realities of a situation.
The recent decisions of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and the Nova
Scotia Court of Appeal in Saulnier37 bring clarity to this issue. In Saulnier
35.

Sugarman, supra note 22 at para. 50.

36.
37.

Ibid. at para. 32.
Saulnier supra note 3.
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the applicant receiver sought a declaration that a fishing licence was a
form of personal property which can be charged under a general security
agreement made pursuant to the PersonalPropertySecurity Act of Nova
Scotia. After a review of the Ontario decisions, Chief Justice Kennedy,
at the trial level, found the reasoning in Sugarman to be compelling. He
specifically approached the issues by first characterizing "the federal
fishing licences based on the reality of the commercial arena."38 In his
decision, Chief Justice Kennedy confirmed what those involved in the
fishing industry in Nova Scotia have known for years:
That evidence confirms my understanding, that on the east coast of
Canada fishing licenses, particularly for lobster, are commonly exchanged
between fishermen for a great deal of money.
Fishing vessels of questionable value are traded for small fortunes
because of the licenses that are anticipated to come with them.
To accept the argument of the respondent that there can be no property in
these licenses in the hands of the holder, because of ministerial control
would, I conclude, foster an unrealistic legal condition based on an
historic definition of property that ignores what is actually happening in
the commercial world that the law must serve.
It is important that the law address and reflect the obvious, that although
those licenses do not give exclusive control to the holder, they do in fact
provide a bundle of rights which constitute marketable property capable
of providing security.
There are lending institutions apparently prepared to accept the holder's
interest in these licenses as intangible personal property with potential
as security.
The Minister may not agree to the strategy for realizing such security
upon default, however that is a risk that the lender accepts.
Using the same logic I find that such licenses are also property for
purposes of the BIA.
To ignore commercial reality would be to deny creditors access to
something of significant value in the hands of the bankrupt. That would
be both artificial and potentially inequitable.
Formally I find that the interest of a holder in a fishing license issued by
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is intangible personal property
which can be charged under a security agreement made pursuant to the
P.P.S.A.
I further find that such licenses are property pursuant to the BIA which, in

38.

Ibid. at para. 49.
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appropriate circumstances, a trustee can require a bankrupt to transfer.39
The Chief Justice canvassed jurisprudence which suggests movement
away from Bouckhuyt, noting commentary in The Ontario Personal
Property Security Act: Commentary and Analysis.4" This jurisprudence
is based firmly on commercial reality concerns. He also noted the Tax
Court decision of EA.S. Seafood ProducersLtd. v. The Queen.41 In this
case, which addressed whether a licence was an expense or capital, Chief
Justice Bowie acknowledged that the evidence indicated that licence
renewals were almost always granted and that:
...
the commercial reality is that the Appellant entered into the transactions
...
not simply to be able to fish the licenses in the short run, but with a
view to acquiring the expectation of a long series of renewals in the
future. It is the prospect of this series of renewals that constitutes 'an
asset of an enduring nature', and which prompted the Appellant to pay
$150,000 for the two licenses.. 11
Many cases dealing with fishing licence issues focus upon the absolute
discretion conferred upon the Minister by section 7 of the Act. Chief
Justice Kennedy agreed with the suggestion that, if commercial reality
is to dictate the outcome, the "absolute discretion" of the Minister was
of little relevance to the true nature of a licence holder's interest. 43 It
was further argued that a decision that fishing licences were not personal
property would allow the bankrupt to "successfully 'blow off his creditors'
and then sell his licences for a substantial sum in the commercial market
place." 44 Given the value attributed to most fishing licences this must have
played a factor in the approach adopted by the Court.
The Chief Justice recognized an important attribute of the security
interest in a fishing licence when he stated "the Minister may not agree to
the strategy for realizing such security upon default." The present statutory
regime is not conducive to a commercial market in fishing licences.
However, DFO has adopted policies which tolerate, if not outright accept,
the commercial realities of a market for fishing licences. Since this market
is dependant upon such policies, lenders and the industry as a whole run
the risk that the Minister may alter the policy at some time after funds are

39. Ibid.atparas. 51-60.
40. Ziegel and Denomme, The OntarioPersonalPropertySecurity Act: Commentary and Analysis,
2"d ed. (Markum: Butterworths, 2000). See para. 23 of the Saulnierdecision.
41. (1995),98 D.T.C. 2034.
42. Ibid. at para. 15.
43. Saulnier,supra note 3 at para. 42.
44. Ibid. at para. 36.
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advanced.45 Presumably lenders receive appropriate advice in this regard
and value their security accordingly.
The Court of Appeal took a different approach to the question. In the
appeal decision Justice Fichaud undertook the analysis absent in the trial
decision of the statutory definitions, finding that a fishing license fell within
both the definition of "property" under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act
and "personal property" under the PPSA. He placed substantial emphasis
on the provision of section 16(10) of the Fisheries(General)Regulations
which provides that a licence is the property of the Crown and is not
transferable, concluding on the basis of this clear statement that whatever
property there is in a fishing licence itself cannot be the property of licence
holder. The Court ofAppeal took the position that the "commercial reality"
approach adopted by Chief Justice Kennedy did not have any bearing on
the property status of a fishing license. It chose instead to rely upon the
statutory definitions.4 6
Nonetheless while Justice Fichaud for the Court concluded that a
fishing licence is the property of the Crown, he acknowledged that the
licence holder may have intangible personal property rights in it, noting
that recent jurisprudence had taken a "bundle of rights" view of the legal
47
status of statutory licences.
III. Bankruptcy
The next question is whether a licence is property such that a trustee in
bankruptcy gains control of the licence once the licence holder becomes
bankrupt. In Saulnier the question of whether a fishing licence was
property within the definition of the Bankruptcy andInsolvency Act 48 was
also addressed. As noted above in Joliffe, the interest in a fishing licence is
subject to validly enacted laws. While a fishing licence may be determined
to be property under personal property security legislation, it is not
necessarily the case that it will be considered so under other legislation,
though many of the arguments are equally compelling. In the context
of other legislation, it is possible that the definition of property can be
broader than either the common law definition or the approach within the
FisheriesAct. It is this issue which arises with respect to the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act. Within this Act:
"Property" means any type of property, whether situated in Canada or
elsewhere, and includes money, goods, things in action, land and every
45. Such policy reviews are not uncommon. The Atlantic Fisheries Policy Review has been
underway for some time, with extensive industry consultation.
46. Saulnier,supra note 3 at paras. 17 and 18.
47. Ibid. at paragraphs 27 and 28.
48. Supra note 4.
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description of property, whether real or personal, legal or equitable, as
well as obligations, easements and every description of a state, interest
and profit, present or future, vested or contingent, in, arising out of or
incident to property.
The relevance of this definition is apparent from the effect of an
assignment in bankruptcy. 49 All of the property of the bankrupt will vest
in the trustee and will be subject to eventual distribution among creditors.
The interaction with personal property matters remains important as the
position of a secured creditor is substantially better in bankruptcy.
There is a surprising amount of case law dealing with fishing licences
in the context of bankruptcy. What is surprising is that the results are
so divergent and contradictory. Perhaps the most frequently cited case
is Re Bennett.5" In Re Bennett, the holder of a herring gill net licence
made an assignment in bankruptcy. The case revolved around a dispute
between the trustee and the Inspector as to the disposition of the fishing
licence. The Court acknowledged that there existed a practice in the
industry of selling or leasing the beneficial interest in licences and that
DFO tacitly accepted this practice. In Re Bennett, the bankrupt agreed
to pay $9,000 to the trustee for the licence but the Inspector rejected this
approach. The decision focused on whether the licence can be said to
be property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
The Court acknowledged that it may be correct that the licence does not
create an interest in property at common law but noted the definition of
property in the Act, particularly the latter portion of the definition: "...
and includes obligations, easements and every description of the state,
interest and profit, present or future, vested or contingent, in, arising out
of, or incidental to property." Justice Ryan found that this aspect of the
definition included "interests which extend beyond the general notion of
property and can include such interests as the licence possessed by Mr.
Bennett."'"
Justice Ryan did, however, go on to find that the licence was only
property for the year in which it was issued, noting that the licence holder
had only a "right to reapply" for the licence for future years. He concluded
that this was "in reality nearly an ability to acquire property, but is not a
property interest in itself." He stated:
49. See section 71 of the BIA: "On a bankruptcy order being made or an assignment being filed with
an official receiver, a bankrupt ceases to have any capacity to dispose of or otherwise deal with their
property, which shall, subject to this Act and to the rights of secured creditors, immediately pass to and
vest in the trustee named in the bankruptcy order or assignment, and in any case of change of trustee
the property shall pass from trustee to trustee without any assignment or transfer."
50. (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 314 (B.C.S.C.) [Re Bennett]
51. Ibid.atpara.9.
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What counsel characterized as a "right to reapply" for the licence is in
reality merely an ability to acquire property, but is not a property interest
in itself It might be suggested that if the licence is property in the sense
that it is an "interest or profit incidental to property", then the right to
reapply must be a contingent interest in the same thing. The answer lies
in the nature of the asserted interest. The licence holder has no right of
renewal. The granting of the licence is purely discretionary. Although it
has been different in the past, my reading of the regulations indicates that
anyone may apply for a roe herring licence. For purely historical reasons
Mr. Bennett belongs to a group which is more likely to find success in
obtaining a licence than other groups or individuals. Mr. Bennett, in
the result, has no higher legal right to obtain the licence than any other
applicant. His interest is illusory. 2

This issue was addressed more recently in Re Dugas.3 The bankrupt
was a crab fisherman who sold his licences to a creditor without first
obtaining the approval of the DFO. The DFO declined to give approval
and the creditor ultimately sued for breach of contract, obtaining judgment.
After making an assignment in bankruptcy, the bankrupt continued to use
the fishing licence and later brought an application for discharge from
bankruptcy. The Court addressed whether the licence was property which
ought to be distributed to the creditors.
Registrar Bray placed particular emphasis in the earning potential
of the licence. While recognizing the provisions of the FisheriesAct and
regulations were clear, noting the divergence of the case law, he took a
broader approach in order to give effect to the objectives of the bankruptcy
legislation, 54 While he recognized the different approaches, the Registrar
stated that "there is obviously a beneficial interest on the part of the
Bankrupt in a licence regardless of where the formal ownership lies." He
went on to find:
Although ultimate control ofthe license rests with the Federal Government
such that it cannot be assigned and resold at will, it would be frivolous
to suggest that the Bankrupt has no legal or equitable right to the benefits
conferred by this permit, as long as he is exploiting it in accordance with
DFO policies. The parliament has granted a right that is not exclusive
to an individual but to a group of persons, fishers in the administrative
zone, who are entitled to have that right assigned. The possibility of
assignment results in competition and consequent commercial value that
could be realized as income by the holder upon its devise. To hold that
such income should be withheld from the estate and not inure to the
benefit of creditors would be contrary to the principles of the bankruptcy
legislation.
52.
53.
54.

Ibid. at para. 14.
(2004), 50 C.B.R. (4th) 200 (N.B.Q.B.)
Ibid. at para. 23.
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Public interest in the proper administration of the Act would be offended
were the Bankrupt to receive a discharge and be able to immediately
thereafter resume business as successfully as before or alienate a right
in consideration of a substantial profit while making no provisions for
creditors. 5
Taking a very practical view, the Registrar focused on the exploitation of
the licence, rather than its inherent nature. Ultimately the discharge was
granted, but its operation was suspended for a period of time during which
6
surplus income was to be paid to the trustee.
There are a number of contrary cases. In Waryk v. Bank of Montreal7

the Bank financed the purchase of a commercial fishing licence and a
boat. Eventually the company ran into financial difficulties and the Bank
petitioned it into bankruptcy. The Bank seized the boat, selling it and the
fishing licence to a third party who then resold them. The original owners
asked the trustee to sue the Bank for the difference between the price paid
by the third party and the price which he subsequently sold the boat for.
The trustee refused, but assigned the right of action to the plaintiffs. The
plaintiffs sued the bank claiming that the bank wrongfully petitioned the
company into bankruptcy. Ultimately, the action was dismissed.58
The Court found that the licence remained the property of the Crown
and "that it never was and never became an individual and independent
article of commerce in which either the company or Waryk had a disposable
title which by the bankruptcy of the company either was deprived."5 9 The
Court stated:
Even if I am wrong in so holding and that the company/Waryk did have
in the licence a property interest which passed to the trustee (as was held
in Re Bennett (1988), 24 B.C.L.R. (2d) 346, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 314 (S.C.),
a case of a personal fishing licence), there is nothing to prevent a secured
creditor availing itself of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act in order to
enhance its position:
Re BlackBros. (1978) Ltd. (1982), 41 C.B.R. (N.S.)
60
163 (B.C.S.C.).

55. Ibid.at paras. 26-27.
56. In an earlier decision in the history of this bankrupt, which was referred to in the above decision,
Justice Leger made a brief statement that, in his view, "the Bankrupt's 2003 crab licence is property
under the Act. In the least, the right to fish for crab is an interest or profit arising out of property or
incidental to property." (para. 17) The decision was appealed at [2004] N.B.J. No. 69 (C.A.) but the
Court of Appeal did not comment on this issue.
57. (1990), 80 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (B.C.S.C.) [Waryk].
58. The specific licence in this case was a "T" licence for groundfish, issued pursuant to the Pacific
FisheryRegistration andLicensing Regulations, S.O.R./83-102. These regulations included a similar
statement that commercial fishing licences are the property of the Crown. This licence was, however,
issued in respect of a commercial fishing vessel and was not issued to a company or person.
59. Waryk, supra note 57 at para. 108.
60. Ibid.atpara. 118.
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The ratio of the decision is somewhat convoluted. The essence appears to
be based on the fact that the licence was issued to the vessel. It seems that
the Court concluded that since there was no property in the licence, it did
not pass to the trustee. The secured creditor could therefore take possession
of the licence as incidental to its secured position over the vessel. At the
Court of Appeal, the Court affirmed the decision taking particular notice of
the fact that the licence was specific to a particular vessel. 6
In Re Jenkins, a bankrupt lobster fisherman brought an application
for discharge from bankruptcy.62 One of the issues involved was whether
the trustee had the ability to deal with the lobster licence. The Court
acknowledged that the Minister had the discretion whether or not to issue
licences in succeeding years and that the licence remained the property of
the Crown. After a review of Re Bennett, Registrar Hill stated:
A different result as to whether or not a fishing licence constitutes a

"property" as such is defined in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act was
reached in the case of Noel v. Savard (1990), an unreported decision of
the Quebec Superior Court. In that case the Court found that a fishing
licence was only a permit to do something. It did not confer any property
or contractual rights which could be lawfully sold, traded or devised by
will. In essence, the Court concluded it was a privilege to do something,
subject to its terms. The Court found that a fishing licence was not
"property" as defined in the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.
I prefer the reasoning of the Quebec Superior Court. It seems to me
that the ability to engage in the fishery is a privilege controlled by the
governing authority, that is the Government of Canada. The Act and the
Regulations make it clear that licences such as that held by Mr. Jenkins
are issued for the period of only one year, and that the Minister has an
absolute discretion as to whether or not to renew the licences. While
there may be an "underground" trade in these licences, the Regulations

also make it clear that the licence is and remains the property of the
Crown. I question whether a licence, which is the property of the Crown,
can simultaneously be the property of some other party. If there were a

joint property interest in the licence surely the Regulation would indicate
that to be the case. It does not. That being so I cannot make any order
compelling Mr. Jenkins to hand over his licence to the Trustee for the
purpose of resale so as to benefit the estate.
If I am wrong in this finding as to whether or not a fishing licence
constitutes "property" as such is defined in the Bankruptcy andinsolvency
Act, then I would point out that the licence in question was the licence
for 1994, the year in which Mr. Jenkins became a bankrupt. Clearly that

61.
62.

(1991), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 233 (B.C.C.A.).
(1997), 32 C.B.R. (4") 262 (N.S.S.C.)
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licence has long since expired.63
The New Brunswick Court of Queen's Bench addressed the same
issue in Caisse Populaire de Shippagan Ltge v. Ward.64 In this case, the
fishermen applied for an absolute discharge. The Credit Union, creditor
of the bankrupt, objected and asked that the bankrupt's fishing licence be
sold and the proceeds distributed. The Court ultimately concluded that the
fishing licence was not property within the definition of the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act, canvassing both Re Bennett and the Noel v. Savard
decision referred to by Registrar Hill in Re Jenkins. The comments on the
Noel v. Savard decisions are particularly interesting:
On the other hand, in Noel v. Savard et al., a Quebec Superior Court
decision, No. 650-11-000004-9092 (July 1990), the bankrupt Noel
refused to hand over his commercial fishing licence to the trustee. Paul
Corriveau, J. decided as follows:
Contrary to Bennett, cited by counsel for the trustee, no financial
interest is incidental to the licence held by the debtor. The Court
can't do anything about the fact that, in practice, commercial
fishing licence-holders "find ways" to cash in on their licence.
The administrative authorities know about this practice and do
nothing to stop it. The Court cannot find anything in the law to
forbid it.
We must therefore find that a bankrupt's fishing licence is not
property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
The Quebec Court of Appeal dismissed the trustee's appeal in these
terms:
The appellant trustee asks that the bankrupt, a commercial
fisherman whose right to fish is based solely on a licence issued
by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans of Canada, hand
over his licence so that it may be dealt with as an asset of the
estate.
For reasons given by the trial judge, to the effect that a
commercial fishing licence is not assignable nor transferrable,
that it is the property of the Crown, and that it is exempt from
seizure because it is merely a privilege of a personal nature
conferred on the respondent at the discretion of the Federal
Crown, - reasons which we adopt. 65

63. Ibid. at paras. 25-27.
64. [2000] N.B.J. No. 378 [CaissePopulaire].
65. Ibid. at para. 6. The Noel v. Savard decision is unavailable in English and is therefore cited from
within the Caisse Populairedecision.
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Ultimately, the Court concluded, on the basis of Noel v. Savard, that the
fishing licence was not property within the meaning of the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act. Justice McIntyre noted that if he was wrong in so
deciding, he adopted Justice Ryan's words in Re Bennett that as of the
date of the application for discharge, the bankrupt was no longer in the
possession of the licence because it had not been renewed.66
In another decision by Registrar Hill, Re Townsend 67 , the Court also
concluded that quota was not property under the Bankruptcy andinsolvency
Act. The issue in that case was whether the fishing quota was property and
thus assigned to the trustee by virtue of the Act. Registrar Hill cited to his
own decision in Re Jenkins wherein he concluded that since the licence
was the property of the Crown, it could not simultaneously be the property
of some other party. With respect to the quota, he stated:
I would not differentiate between quota and a licence and therefore find
that the assignment in bankruptcy did not have68 the effect of assigning
any property interest in the quota to the trustee.
As is evident, there is a disparity within the case law over whether
a fishing licence constitutes property for the purposes of the Bankruptcy
andInsolvency Act. Chief Justice Kennedy in the trial decision of Saulnier
made a clear finding the fishing licences are "property pursuant to the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act which, in appropriate circumstances, a
trustee can require a bankrupt to transfer. ' 69 This statement is unequivocal.
However, while Chief Justice Kennedy addressed in detail the law relevant
to the personal property issue he did not consider any cases dealing with
bankruptcy. Though he cited the definition of property in the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act, there was no consideration of the underlying issues,
other than those common to the personal property issue. The absence of any
substantive analysis detracted from the weight of authority to be assigned
to the decision on this particular point though many of the arguments
with respect to personal property have equal force in bankruptcy. While
it seems apparent that the definition of property in the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act is broadly stated, it cannot be ignored that both the Quebec
and British Columbia Courts of Appeal have ruled that, in the particular
66. In the decision, Justice McIntyre referred to an unreported decision of the Quebec Superior
Court, Chicoine v. Corporation Immobiliire du Nouveau-Quebec Limite et al. (11 February 2000),
650-11-00/05-980 (Que. S.C.) In this decision, Justice Corriveau ordered the sale of the licence by
tender with 85% of the proceeds distributed to unsecured creditors. There is no indication of the ratio
but Justice McIntyre expressly declined to follow Chicoine.
67. (2002) 32 C.B.R. (4th) 318 (N.S.S.C.).
68. Ibid. at para. 12.
69. Saulnier trial decision, supra note 3 at para. 60. Presumably the "appropriate circumstances"
relate to finding a purchaser who is eligible to take the licence in his or her name.
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circumstances, a fishing licence was not property for the purposes of the
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. This left uncertainty over the outcome.
The Court of Appeal of Nova Scotia has added necessary clarity on this
point.
In his decision Justice Fichaud acknowledged that the definition of
property within the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act included beneficial
interests even though the property was legally owned by another.7" He
said:
In my view, during the term of a license, a licensee has a beneficial
interest in the earnings from use of the license. That interest, and the
right to those earnings, pass to the trustee in bankruptcy of the license
holder. This is not a "right to fish", and does not prejudice DFO's powers
to cancel a license or regulate its use as authorized by theFisheries Act
and regulations. 7
Justice Fichaud correctly recognized that the real issue was whether Mr.
Saulnier had rights relating to renewal or reissuance of the licence.7 2 For
there to be any value to the trustee in enforcing against the licence, the
trustee needed to be able to enforce contractual provisions requiring Mr.
Saulnier to seek reissuance of the licence to the designate of the trustee.
Noting the "undulating" line of authority, Justice Fichaud analyzed many
of the cases discussed above in a thorough canvass of the jurisprudence.
After reviewing the cases which held that the privilege of renewal of
licences is "transitory and ephermeral," Justice Fichaud examined the
opposing line of authorities, and he concluded:
In my view, the principles espoused by the three Courts of'Appeal in B.C.
Packers, Theriault and Careen converge at the destination reached by
the Ontario Court of Appeal in Sugarman. If the law entitles the license
holder to resist an arbitrary non-renewal of the license, then the license
holder's rights are not "transitory or ephemeral". The license holder has
a legally recongized right - limited though it may be - that constitutes
intangible personal property. Depending on the paradigm, that limited
right either rests somewhere in the "bundle of rights" from Sugarman,
or is a "beneficial interest" under B.C. Packers, Theriault and Careen.
The security holder or trustee in bankruptcy takes the license holder's
limited legal right or beneficial interest. The security holder or trustee
takes subject to all the risks of non-renewal that applied to the license
holder - ie. non-renewal on grounds that are not arbitrary. This ensures
that the interest of the security holder or trustee in bankruptcy does not
degrade the regulatory scheme of the legislation, the concern underlying

70. Saulnier, supra note 3 at para. 30.
71. Ibid. at para. 38.
72. Ibid. at para. 39.
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the National Trust line of cases.73

Citing cases dealing specifically with fishing licences, Justice Fichaud
found that the rights of the licence holder are not "transitory and ephemeral"
and are intangible personal property falling within the definition of
"property" in the Bankruptcy andInsolvencyAct. Of particular importance,
he held that Mr. Saulnier's rights to apply for a renewal or reissuance of
the licence passed to the trustee, subject to the same risks and equities that
affect the bankrupt.74
Conclusion
Until Saulnier, there remained substantial uncertainty as to how a fishing
licence would be treated for the purposes of personal property security
legislation. Prior to Saulnier, the question had not been addressed by the
Courts in respect of a fishing license, although the courts in Ontario had
dealt with other types of licences. Specifically, the Ontario courts held
that "if the discretion was considered broad, then the licence would be
characterized as a privilege, whereas if the discretion was of a limited
nature, then the licence would be viewed as a property right in the licence
holder."75 Given the emphasis on discretion and non-transferability in
the provisions of the Fisheries Act and its regulations, it is likely that a
court using the Ontario test would not find a fishing license to be personal
property for the purposes of the PPSA or more generally for the purposes
of taking a security interest. While this accords with the apparent intent
of the legislation, there are obvious commercial realities at play. DFO has
long condoned a system which results in transfers of fishing licences for
value. There are a number of decisions that recognize the importance of
commercial realities in determining the property status within a statutory
regime. This approach had not been applied to fishing licenses before
Saulnier.
While previous decisions have considered whether a licence is property
at common law, in Saulnier the focus at the trial level was upon whether
a fishing licence was property in the context of two statutory regimes, the
PPSA and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. In that regard the statutory
wording and legislative intent are important. Chief Justice Kennedy's
determination that "the interest of a holder in a fishing licence issued by
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans is intangible personal property
which can be charged under a security agreement made pursuant to the

73. Ibid.at para. 49.
74. Ibid.at para. 56. The Court also held that the trustee was entitled to direct Mr. Saulnier to execute
the documentation to effect reissuance to the designate of the trustee.
75. Sugarman, supra note 22 at para. 32.
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PPSA"76 is clear and unequivocal. On this issue he canvassed the relevant
case law and came to what appears to be both the practical and appropriate
decision.
The Chief Justice placed significant emphasis on "commercial reality"
in his decision, an argument which the Court of Appeal wholly discounted.
However, the Court of Appeal still made an unequivocal finding that a
fishing license is intangible personal property. While recognizing that the
regulations are clear that a fishing license is the property of the Crown,
Justice Fichaud acknowledged jurisprudence which has held that such
licenses are composed of a "bundle of rights". The result is that the Crown
holds only a portion of those rights while the license holder has certain
intangible personal property rights which can be the subject of a security
agreement.
Chief Justice Kennedy also found that that fishing licences are property
pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and that the trustee could,
in appropriate circumstances, require a bankrupt to transfer licences.
However, while Chief Justice Kennedy addressed the law relevant to the
personal property question he did not consider any cases dealing with
bankruptcy. Though he cited the definition of property in the Bankruptcy
and Insolvency Act there was no consideration of the underlying issues,
other than those common to the personal property issue. The absence of
substantive analysis detracted from the weight of the trial decision on this
particular point.
An analysis of the jurisprudence favours the view that a licence is
property for the purposes of the Bankruptcy andInsolvency Act. However,
both the Quebec and British Columbia Courts of Appeal have ruled that,
in the particular circumstances, a fishing licence is not property for the
purposes of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. This left some uncertainty
which the Nova Scotia Court ofAppeal in Saulnierclarified by conducting
a review of areas not addressed in the trial decision. The Court held that a
fishing licence itself is not property of the licence holder but the licensee
has a beneficial interest in the earnings from the use of the license which
can be passed on to the trustee in bankruptcy.
In the absence of any policy changes on the part of DFO, lenders
will continue to advance funds taking security, at least in part, on fishing
licences. The value of this security is directly affected by the ability to take
a secured position with the resulting priorities and enforcement options.
A legislative amendment to the Fisheries Act or the personal property
security legislation (or other relevant legislation) could achieve this end, as

76.

Saulnier,supra note 3 at para. 59.

526

The Dalhousie Law Journal

in the Ontario NursingHomes Act discussed in Sugarman. In the absence
of an amendment, the decisions of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court and
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Saulnier add a great deal of certainty.
The combined effect of the trial and appeal decisions is a well-considered
analysis of the law to date.

